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I. INTRODUCTION

In presenting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA or Actf' to Congress for approval, the Executive
Branch consistently identified its broad purposes as the
"facilitat[ion] and depoliticiz[ation] [of] litigation against foreign states and [the] minimiz[ation] [of] irritations in foreign
relations arising out of such litigation."2 To facilitate litigaCroft Assistant Professor of International Law and Jessie D.
Puckett, Jr.
Lecturer in Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support rendered by Dean Samuel M. Davis and
the Lamar Order.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(0), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on
H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomrm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm.L on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 29 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State); Letter
from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General, to Hon. Carl 0. Albert, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Oct. 31, 1975), in H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 44-45 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6634; Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll,
Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General,
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tion against foreign states,3 the FSIA codifies the doctrine of
restrictive sovereign immunity,' provides generous subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction for suits originally brought against foreign states in federal courts, 5 and
enables private litigants to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over foreign states by service of process.6 To minimize the
to Hon. Nelson D. Rockefeller, President of the Senate (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 88, 88 (1976). See also Hearings, supra, at 68 (statement
of the International Law and Transactions Division of the District of Columbia Bar) (indicating that the FSIA would promote greater fairness to litigants
dealings with foreign
and "reduce political friction and embarrassment in...

governments").
Facilitation of litigation and the minimization of irritations in foreign
relations constitute two particular elements of the depoliticization of litigation
against foreign states, which many observers identified as the FSIA's overarching goal. See Hearings, supra, at 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice), 60
(testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, Co-Chairman, Committee on Transnational
Judicial Procedure, American Bar Association), 71 (Letter from Timothy W.
Stanley, President of the International Economic Policy Association, to Hon.
Walter Flowers, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 24,
1976)).
3. For most purposes, the FSIA defines a "foreign state" to include the foreign state itself and its political subdivisions, as well as agencies or
instrumentalities of the foreign state and its political subdivisions. See 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a). Enterprises preponderantly owned by foreign states often
fall within this definition. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supranote 2, at 15-16,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614. In a few situations, however, the
FSIA distinguishes between foreign states and their political subdivisions, on
the one hand, and their agencies and instrumentalities, on the other hand.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3) (exceptions to immunity from suit based on acts
of expropriation), 1606 (punitive damages), 1608(a), (b) (service of process),
1610(a), (b) (exceptions to immunity from execution). Where appropriate, this
article also distinguishes between foreign states and political subdivisions
and their agencies and instrumentalities.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. Essentially, the doctrine of restrictive
foreign sovereign immunity maintains immunity for claims based on the sovereign acts of foreign states, but withholds their immunity for claims based
on non-sovereign acts. See icL; Charles H. Brower, II, InternationalImmunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
2 (2000).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), (b). Before passage of the FSIA, plaintiffs
lacked a statutory mechanism for gaining in personam jurisdiction over foreign states. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606. As a result, plaintiffs developed the practice of using
in rem attachments to commence litigation. See id. Accord Hearings, supra
note 2, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State),
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irritations associated with such litigation, the FSIA insulates foreign states from some of the more offensive aspects
of U.S. litigation. Thus, foreign states enjoy significant protection from in rem jurisdiction, 7 prejudgment attachment,8
punitive damages, 9 and jury trials.'" They also receive spe68 (statement by the International Law and Transactions Division of the District of Columbia Bar), 97 (testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Chainnan,
Committee on Maritime Legislation, Maritime Law Association).
Frequent interference with the property rights of foreign states became
a source of diplomatic friction that the FSIA sought to eliminate. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State), 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation
Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice), 68 (statement by the International Law and Transactions Division of the District of Columbia Bar), 97
(testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Chairman, Committee on Maritime Legislation, Maritime Law Association); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at
27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6626; JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 75 (1988).

7. See Hearings,supra note 2, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State), 68 (statement by the International Law and
Transactions Division of the District of Columbia Bar), 97 (testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Chairman, Committee on Maritime Legislation, Maritime
Law Association); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 26, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6625; DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 76.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610 (a)-(dJ. The FSIA permits prejudgment attachment only if (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from
prejudgment attachment and (2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure
satisfaction of any future judgment (and not to obtain jurisdiction). See 28
U.S.C. § 1610(d).
9. The exemption from punitive damages applies to foreign states and their
political subdivisions, but not to their agencies and instrumentalities. See 28
U.S.C. § 1606; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6609. In addition, the exemption does not apply to claims
brought by U.S. nationals for "personal injury or death that was caused by
an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or
the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act" by designated state sponsors of terror. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). See also 28 U.S.C. §
1606.
10. The exemption from jury trials applies to actions originally commenced
in federal court or removed to federal court, but not to actions pending in
state courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 458(4) & cmt. b (1987); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2,
at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611. The elimination of jury trials
obviously creates a strong incentive for foreign states to remove actions from
state courts to federal courts. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 32,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631 (noting the FSIA's "preference that actions involving foreign states be tried in federal courts"); Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (stating that "Congress deliberately sought to channel cases against foreign sovereigns away from state
courts and into federal courts"). Responding to this incentive, foreign states
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cial treatment with respect to service of process and additional time for answering complaints." Furthermore, when
foreign states fail to appear, plaintiffs may not obtain judgments without establishing their claims by "evidence satisfactory to the court."'2 Most importantly, foreign states
have the absolute right to remove civil actions from state
court to federal court without regard to the nature of the
claim, the amount in controversy or the wishes of other defendants.'3 In brief, the FSIA balances the rights of plaintiffs and defendants by promoting the initiation of legitimate
claims against foreign states, but limiting the opportunities
for harassment of foreign states."
Although the FSIA generally strikes an acceptable balance between these two goals, this article examines one

have removed nearly all suits brought against them In state court. See
DELLAPENNA, supranote 6, at 64.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), (b), (d).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 359 (observing
that the "demand for satisfactory proof effectively charges courts to prevent
undue offense to foreign states by dismissing unfounded claims"). This requirement apparently has served the gate-keeping function intended by Congress. One early study found that plalntiffs succeeded in collecting judgments in only two of seventeen instances where foreign states failed to appear. See id.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 3233, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631-32; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489;
Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1065 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. No.
94-1487); Teledyne, Inc v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1990);
Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 530 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1993); John B. Oakley, Prospectusfor the American Law Institute's FederalJudicialCode Revision
ProjecL 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 855, 873 (1998); Jonathan Remy Nash, Pendent Party Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 16 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 71, 78, 117 (1998); Carol K. Young, Defending Litigation Against a
Foreign Airline Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 51 J. AIR. L. &
CoM. 461, 485 (1986).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (stating that the FSIA will "protect the rights of
both foreign states and litigants in United States courts"). See also Hearings,
supra note 2, at 59 (testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, Co-Chairman, Committee
on Transnational Judicial Procedure, American Bar Association) (observing
that the FSIA would provide "highly beneficial" reforms to private litigants,
but would also provide foreign states important procedural safeguards), 97
(testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Chairman, Committee on Maritime Legislation, Maritime Law Association) (indicating that the United States never
allowed itself to be subjected to harassment by private litigants and describing the State Department's belief that the exposure of foreign states to such
harassment could disrupt foreign relations).
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possible area of failure, namely the interaction between the
FSIA's provisions for removal, jurisdiction, and venue. As
previously observed, the FSIA encourages foreign states to
remove actions from state court to federal court, and
foreign states almost invariably use removal as an escape
hatch.'5 Upon removal, however, foreign states may find
that federal venue rules lock them into inconvenient fora
with unfavorable choice-of-law rules and unexpectedly long
statutes of limitations.
To prepare the ground for a
discussion of this phenomenon, Part I describes the FSIA's
use of restrictive venue rules to counteract its expansive
jurisdictional provisions for actions originally commenced
in federal courts. Part II then examines the failure of venue
rules to moderate the exercise of jurisdiction in removed actions, as well as the resulting opportunities to harass foreign states. Part III discusses the futility of using a frequently proposed tool to resolve this problem, namely the
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Finally, Part
IV suggests that federal courts may eliminate the problem
through a more rigorous and attentive interpretation of the
FSIA.
At one level, this article represents a technical discussion of the FSIA's neglected,'6 but important,' venue provisions. In addition, two important themes run throughout
the article's text, both of which merit discussion on the
FSIA's silver anniversary. First, the Act tries to strike a
balance between the facilitation of litigation against foreign
states and the protection of foreign states from aggravating
features of U.S. litigation. In our zeal to satisfy the first objective, we often lose sight of the second objective. Second,
although the FSIA may be "complex and difficult to apply,"'"
15. See supra note 10.
16. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 126-27 (describing venue as a "neglected" concept that "has not been the focus of significant scholarship").
17. Identification of the appropriate venue for trial "is no trivial question,
as proper venue is a component of the due process requirement of 'a fair trial
in a fair tribunal.'" Crumrine v. NEG Micon USA, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1124 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (quoting Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965)).
18. William R. Dorsey, 111, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 257, 301 (1997) (quoting Mark
Feldman, The United States ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder'sView, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 318 (1986)).
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rigorous and attentive analysis can resolve most interpretive questions. All too often, we manufacture problems
through cursory analysis of the statute and then blame its
"bizarre structure" for the curious results.'9 Like everything
else, proper husbandry of the FSIA requires care and attention.
II.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND EQUILIBRIUM

Foreign states enjoy a presumption of immunity in civil
actions brought against them in state and federal courts. °
That presumption remains subject to a limited number of
exceptions,2 ' most of which require a significant nexus between the defendant's conduct and the United States. 2 For
example, the most frequently relevant exceptions' involve
19. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 110506 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604; H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6616.
21. See28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607.
22. During congressional hearings, the State Department's Legal Adviser
stated that "each" of the FSIA's exceptions to immunity "requires some connection with the United States." See Hearings, supranote 2, at 28 (testimony
of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State). See also H.R. REP. No.
94-1487, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6626 (suggesting that the FSIA would provide jurisdiction only "in cases where there is
a nexus between the claim and the United States").
The author states that "most" exceptions require some connection because it is not clear if the FSIA's waiver exception requires a nexus with the
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Compare Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (indicating that
the FSIA's waiver exception "requires that the foreign state express a willingness to appear in United States courts" (quoting Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (1994))), with Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 985-86 (N.D. Il. 1980) (stating that
a "waiver [of immunity] does not necessarily confer personal jurisdiction" and
concluding that the FSIA's waiver provision permits the exercise of jurisdiction "regardless of the nature or quality of [the defendant's] contacts with this
country"), and Victoria A. Carter, Note, God Save the King: Unconstitutional
Assertions of PersonalJurisdictionover ForeignStates in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L.
REv. 357, 364 (1996) (asserting that the FSIA's "waiver exception[] contains
no nexus requirement"). Furthermore, it is quite evident that the new exception for certain acts of state-sponsored terror does not require any connection
with the United States, except the nationality of the victim. See 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7).
23. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in 1976
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civil actions based on (1) commercial activities carried on by
foreign states in the United States; (2) the acts of foreign
states performed within the United States in connection
with their commercial activities elsewhere; or (3) the acts of
foreign states outside of the United States in connection
with their commercial activities outside the United States
that have direct effects within the United States."4
Furthermore, in civil actions originally commenced in
federal courts, the FSIA collapses the tests for subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction into the test for
immunity.25 Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) provides federal district courts with original subject matter jurisdiction over
claims in which foreign states are not entitled to immunity." Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) provides that, for cases
falling within the original jurisdiction of federal district
courts under § 1330(a), subject matter jurisdiction plus
service of process establishes personal jurisdiction over foreign states.2 7 While unique, this melding of tests for jurisdiction and immunity appears sensible because most of the
exceptions to immunity identify both a class of claims appropriate for adjudication (e.g., commercial activities) and a
sufficient territorial nexus to attract the judicial jurisdiction
of U.S. courts.
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6617; Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands,
174 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 1981)); Dorsey, supra
note 18, at 264.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
25. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at
23, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6622; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983); Hon. Marianne D. Short & Charles H.
Brower, II, The Taming of the Shrew: May the Act of State Doctrine and Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Eat and Drink as Friends?, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 723, 730
(1997); Young, supranote 13, at 475.

26. Specifically, the statute provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled
to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under
any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
27. Specifically, the statute provides: "Personal jurisdiction over a foreign
state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
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This melding of jurisdiction and immunity also encourages the commencement of litigation against foreign states
in federal courts.29 Because the exceptions to immunity refer to contacts with the "United States," plaintiffs can establish personal jurisdiction in federal district courts based on
contacts with the United States as a whole, as opposed to
contacts with individual states.' According to one observer,
this means that "if a foreign sovereign is subject to personal
jurisdiction in any state, it is subject to personal jurisdiction in every state."3 ' That may constitute an understatement, however, because foreign states not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state of the United States could,
theoretically, be subject to personal jurisdiction in every
judicial district of the United States. For example, a foreign
state that lacks significant contacts with any individual
state, but that has aggregately sufficient contacts with several states in the Southeast, would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the Districts of Alaska, Hawaii, and Minnesota. As the Executive Branch and Congress both observed, plaintiffs "clearly benefit" from this broad jurisdictional structure.2
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section
1608 of this title." Id. § 1330(b). See also U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen
Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 308); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148,
151 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308).
28. The Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary have agreed that the territorial nexuses embedded in the exceptions to immunity "prescribe the necessary contacts before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state." Hearings, supra note 2, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 13,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6612; Dar El-Bina Eng'g & Contracting Co.
v. Republic of Iraq, 79 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 94-1487).
29. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 106.
30. See, e.g., Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314. See also U.S. Titan, 241
F.3d at 152 n.12; Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174
F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 111
(6th Cir. 1995); Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 994 Supp. 1299, 1312 (D.
Colo. 1998); United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 821 F.
Supp. 1405, 1410 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994).
31. Young, supra note 13, at 475, 479.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6626; Section-by-Section Analysis accompanying Letter from
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Deputy
Attorney General, to Hon. Nelson D. Rockefeller, President of the Senate (Oct.

2001]

REMOVAL FROM STATE COURT UNDER THE FSIA

9

Members of the defense bar have suggested that the
FSIA's broad jurisdictional grant puts foreign states at a
"distinct disadvantage" when compared to other defendants. '3 This criticism seems misplaced with respect to actions falling within the original jurisdiction of federal
courts. In such cases, the FSIA's general venue provisions
impose serious limits on plaintiffs' choice of forum.3 4 For
example, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) directs plaintiffs to one of four
locations:
(1) any judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated;
(2) any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a
foreign state is situated, if the the claim is asserted
under § 1605(b) of [the FSIA, dealing with admiralty
suits brought to enforce maritime liens];
(3) any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing business, if the action is brought against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section

1603(b) of [the FSIA]; or
(4) in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof.
To return to the example discussed above,35 if a plaintiff
sued the foreign state in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska, Hawaii, or Minnesota, that court
would have personal jurisdiction but would have to dismiss
or transfer the action for improper venue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs gain no advantage by suing foreign states in jurisdictionally proper, but seriously inconvenient, fora because transferee courts must apply their
31, 1975), supranote 2, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. at 113 (1976).
33. Young, supra note 13, at 461, 475.
34. See Joel Mendal Overton, Will the Real FSIA Choice-of-Law Rule Please
Stand Up?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1591, 1608 (1992). See also Tifa Ltd. v.
Republic of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393, 405 (D.N.J. 1988) (observing that
"[clourts have required extensive events or omissions giving rise to the claim
to occur in the forum in order for venue to be appropriate under
[§ 139 (1)(1)]").
35. See supranotes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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own choice-of-law rules36 and statutes of limitations3 7 following transfers under § 1406(a). Thus, for actions originally
brought in federal courts, the FSIA facilitates litigation by
subjecting foreign states to personal juris-diction throughout the United States on the basis of national contacts, but

minimizes the potential for irritation by using venue requirements to "assure foreign states of an appropriate foru m . ,38

III. REMOVAL: ESCAPE HATCH OR BOOBY TRAP?
Although the FSIA's broad jurisdictional provisions encourage plaintiffs to bring actions against foreign states in
federal court, plaintiffs often file their claims in state courts
where they may be able to demand jury trials. While the
FSIA certainly permits state-court litigation,as the FSIA's
removal provisions ensure that civil actions remain in state
court only at the sufferance of foreign states.' Because removal extinguishes the possibility of a jury trial4 ' and increases the perceived competence and objectivity of the forum,4 2 foreign states typically remove actions from state
36. See, e.g., LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 830

F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 471-72 (6th
Cir. 1980); Young, supra note 13, at 492.
37. See, e.g., Translinear, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 538 F. Supp. 141, 143
(D.D.C. 1982). See also Martin, 623 F.2d at 471-72.
38. Hearings, supra note 2, at 59 (testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, CoChairman, Committee on Transnational Judicial Procedure, American Bar
Association). See also DELLAPENNA, supranote 6, at 127, 133 (observing that
the FSIA's general venue rules operate like traditional long-arm statutes).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
489 (1983); Nash, supra note 13, at 78. In discussing draft legislation predating the FSIA, the Departments of State and Justice jointly observed that
plaintiffs would "have an election to proceed in a federal court or in a court of
a State." Section-by-Section Analysis accompanying Letter from William P.
Rogers, Secretary of State, and Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to
President of the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 118, 156-57
(1973).

40. See Oakley, supranote 13, at 873.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 32, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6632; Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525,
530 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (quoting In re Delta Am. Reinsurance Co., 900 F.2d 890,
893 (6th Cir. 1990)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 458(4) & cmt. b;
Young, supra note 13, at 487.
42. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that foreign states often
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court to federal court. 3 To this extent, removal resembles
an escape hatch. Under certain circumstances, however,
removal can activate a booby trap, which the author has
encountered in practice. Returning to the example discussed above," assume that a plaintiff sued the foreign
state in a state court sitting in Alaska, Hawaii, or Minnesota. The foreign state would almost certainly remove the
action to federal court. The foreign state might also prepare
a motion to dismiss for improper venue on the assumption
that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) governs federal venue in removed
actions." Upon further analysis, however, the foreign state
would discover that the FSIA's removal provision (28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d)), and not the general venue provision, defines the
proper federal venue for removed actions.4 ' According to §
"seek to remove a case.., to avoid local bias in state courts or to seek the
supposed greater expertise of federal courts"). In discussing draft legislation
pre-dating the FSIA, the Departments of State and Justice jointly observed
that "federal courts may be expected to have greater familiarity with [the controlling legal principles] than would be true of courts of the States." Sectionby-Section Analysis accompanying Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of
State, and Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to President of the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), supra note 39, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. at 156-57.
43. See supra note 10. A review of reported FSIA cases confirms the frequency with which foreign states exercise the right of removal. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 844-45 (5th Cir.
2000); Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969,
972 (9th Cir. 1999); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., 985 F.2d 1534, 1541
(11th Cir. 1993); Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir.
1990); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 282 (9th Cir.
1989): Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1106 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985);
Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d
390, 392 (2d Cir. 1985); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705
F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1983); Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola,
35 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 216 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, 1996 WL 507267, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996);
Berdakin v. Consulado de la Republica de El Salvador, 912 F. Supp 458, 460
(C.D. Cal. 1995); Coleman v. Alcolac, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (S.D.
Tex. 1995); Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 529; Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp.
352, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Moore v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 143
F.R.D. 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Zemicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex),
614 F. Supp. 407, 408 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
44. See supra notes 31-32.
45. See Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 913, 940 n.153 (1985) (assuming that the "protections [of § 1391(01 would be available to a defendant under the [FSIA]
through removal").
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 458 reporters' note 1; Ratnaswamy, 1996 WL 507267, at *11; Translinear, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti,
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1441(d), the proper venue for such actions lies in the "district court of the United States for the district and division
where the action is pending." Because venue would thus be
proper in Alaska, Hawaii, or Minnesota, it appears that removal may inadvertently lock foreign states into seriously
inconvenient, but proper, fora. This result can encourage
plaintiffs to bring claims in remote states with particularly
favorable choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations,
which federal courts might have the obligation to apply following removal. 47 Thus, if properly set up by a cunning
plaintiff, removal can become a trap for the unwary.
538 F. Supp. 141, 143-44 (D.D.C. 1982); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3810.1 (2d ed. 1986);Young, supra note
13, at 491-92.
This principle is also well established outside of the FSIA. See, e.g.,
Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1953); PT United
Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1998); Peterson
v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 (11th Cir. 1997); Lambert v. Kysar,
983 F.2d 1110, 1113 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993); IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Crumrine v. NEG Micon USA, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-28 (N.D.
Iowa 2000); Willowbrook Found., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, Inc., 87 F.
Supp. 2d 629, 635 (N.D. Miss. 2000); JMTR Enters., L.L.C. v. Duchin, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D. Mass. 1999); Palace Exploration Co. v. Petroleum Dev.
Co., 41 F. Supp. 2d 427, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Kumarelas v. Kumarelas, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 1249, 1256 (D. Nev. 1998); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Herzog
Servs., Inc, 990 F. Supp. 503, 504 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Jeffrey Mining Prods. v.
Left Fork Mining Co., 992 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hi-Pac, Ltd. v.
Avoset Corp., 980 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (D. Haw. 1997); Totonelly v. Cardiology Assocs. of Corpus Christi, 932 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Dunn
v. Babco Textron, 912 F. Supp. 231, 232 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Bacik v. Peek, 888
F. Supp. 1405, 1413 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 725 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Orn v. Universal Auto.
Ass'n of Indiana, 198 F. Supp. 377, 379-80 (D. Wis. 1961).
47. A split of authority exists regarding the obligation of federal courts to
apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit. See, e.g., Overton, supranote 34. Joined by federal district courts in the District of Columbia and New Jersey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holds that federal courts must apply state choice-of-law rules in cases
falling under the FSIA. See, e.g., Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation
of P.R.C., 923 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1991); Virtual Defense & Dev., Inc. v.
Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2001); Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 678, 682 (D.N.J. 1992). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by contrast, requires federal courts to apply
choice-of-law rules based on federal common law. See, e.g., Schoenberg v.
Exportadora de Sal, 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1989).
Because Congress did not want the FSIA to alter the substantive laws
applicable to disputes, the Second Circuit's view seems more compelling, at
least for causes of action and interpretive questions not arising under federal

REMOVAL FROM STATE COURT UNDER THE FSIA

2001]
IV.

13

ELIMINATING THE BOOBY TRAP: THE FUTILITY OF
CONVENTIONAL TOOLS

To resolve the predicament of foreign states trapped in
inconvenient fora, observers have proposed transfers of
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) "for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."' As explained below, virtually no one has recognized that the requirements for such transfers seriously discourage foreign
states from making viable applications under § 1404(a).
Furthermore, as some observers have acknow-ledged,
transfers pursuant to § 1404(a) do not completely eliminate
the opportunities for harassment. 9
Writers tend to forget that § 1404(a) requires the moving party to prove ° that the plaintiff could originally have

statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610 (stating that the FSIA "is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability"); Pittston Co., 795 F. Supp. at 682 (acknowledging
that federal choice-of-law rules govern "if they are applicable on a basis independent of the FSIA"). See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (holding that choice-of-law rules constitute substantive, as
opposed to procedural, rules of law). Furthermore, the Second Circuit's view
also comports with the Department of State's and Department of Justice's
joint analysis of draft legislation pre-dating the FSIA. See Section-by-Section
Analysis accompanying Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, and
Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to President of the Senate (Jan. 22,
1973), supra note 39, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. at 158 ("Under the Erie doctrine
state substantive law, including choice of law rules, will be applied if the issue before the court is non-federal. On the other hand, federal law will be
applied if the issue is a federal matter.").
In FSIA cases, federal courts seem inclined to apply the limitation
principles of the state in which the action is brought. See Dar E1-Bina Eng'g
& Contracting Co. v. Republic of Iraq, 79 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). Accord Lord Day & Lord v. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co. v.
Viskoza-Loznica, 33 F. Supp. 2d 644, 666 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Sampson v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 10, § 458 reporters' note 1; Section-by-Section Analysis accompanying Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, and Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to President of
the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), supra note 39, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. at 160-61;
DELLAPENNA, supranote 6, at 128.
49. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
50. See Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2001); PI, Inc. v. Ogle, 932 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 289, 290
(D.N.J. 1992); Martin v. S.C. Bank, 811 F. Supp. 679, 683 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
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brought the action in the transferee court regardless of the
defendant's wishes. 5 ' In other words, the foreign state must
prove not only that the transferee court would have been a
proper venue," but also that it would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the action' and personal jurisdiction
51. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960). See also Del
Monte Fresh Produce, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 ("Whether a transfer is appropriate depends on two inquiries: (1) whether the action 'might have been
brought' in the proposed transferee court and (2) whether various factors are
satisfied so as to determine if a transfer to a more convenient forum is justified."); Resorts Int'l, 813 F. Supp. at 290 ("[Slection 1404(a) transfer analys[e]s
require[] two steps. First, the court must determine whether the transferee
district is one in which the action might have originally been brought....
Second, the court must... determine whether the transfer [serves] the convenience of the parties and witnesses and ... the interest of justice."); Abdulghani v. Virgin Islands Seaplane Shuttle, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 113, 113-14
(D.V.I. 1990) (quoting Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985)) (emphasizing that "[slection 1404(a)
requires two fmdings-'that the district court is one where the action might
have been brought and that the convenience of the parties and witnesses in
the interest of justice favor[s] the transfer'"). See also Isbrandtsen Marine
Servs. v. Shanghai Hai Xing Shipping Co., Civ., 1991 WL 211293, at *1 (D.
Or. Apr. 1, 1991) (involving a transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and
the FSIA, and observing that the transferee court must be one in which the
plaintiff might have brought the action).
52. See Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 343-44; Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench
Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1104 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Del Monte Fresh Produce, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1281; Diebold, Inc. v. Firstcard Fin. Servs., Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2000); FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision,
Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 442, 448 (D. Del. 1999); Hi-Pac, Ltd. v. Avoset Corp.,
980 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (D. Haw. 1997); PI, Inc., 932 F. Supp. at 84; Johnston v. Foster-Wheeler Constr., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 496, 503-04 (M.D. Ala. 1994);
E&J Gallo Winery v. F&P S.p.A., 899 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994); Bacik v. Peek, 888 F. Supp. 1405, 1413 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Tomar Elecs., Inc. v.
Whelen Techs., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 871, 877 (D. Ariz. 1992); Resorts Int'l, 813
F. Supp. at 290; Martin, 811 F. Supp. at 683: 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL.,
supra note 46, § 3845. See also Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, 1996 WL
507267, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996) (involving a 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer
motion under the FSIA); Isbrandtsen Marine Sews., 1991 WL 211293, at *2
(same); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 3810.1 (applying
this rule to FSIA cases).
53. See Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1104 n.5; Diebold, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 763; Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920-21
(W.D. Tenn. 1999); FS Photo, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 448; Johnston, 158 F.R.D. at
503-04; E&J Gallo Winery, 899 F. Supp. at 466; Bacik, 888 F. Supp. at 1413;
Resorts Int'l, 813 F. Supp. at 290; Martin, 811 F. Supp. at 683; Abdulghani,
749 F. Supp. at 114; 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 3845.

See also IsbrandtsenMarine Servs., 1991 WL 211293, at *2 (involving a 28
U.S.C. § 1404 transfer motion under the FSIA).
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over the defendant." However, because the FSIA makes
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction coextensive with non-immunity for actions originally brought in
federal court, it seems unlikely that foreign states will want
to establish the most fundamental requirement for transfer
unless they are prepared to concede their lack of immunity.5 5 Since it is the author's experience that foreign states
are unwilling to do so except in clear cases, one should not
expect transfers of venue under § 1404(a) to provide a viable solution.
Furthermore, most foreign states will not succeed in
demonstrating that transfers serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. To carry
that burden, defendants must usually establish that they
have strong contacts with the transferee forum, that important witnesses and evidence lie within the transferee forum,
and that legally significant events transpired within the
transferee forum. 6 However, since the exceptions to immu-

54. See Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 343-44; Trierweiler,90 F.3d at 1545; Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir.
1991); Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1104 n.5; Del Monte FreshProduce, 136 F. Supp. 2d
at 1281; Diebold, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 763; Union PlantersBank, 67 F. Supp.
2d at 920-21; FS Photo, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 448; Moore v. McKibbon Bros., 41
F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1998); PI, Inc., 932 F. Supp. at 84; Johnston, 158 F.R.D. at 503-04; E&J Gallo Winery, 899 F. Supp. at 466; Bacik, 888
F. Supp. at 1413; Tomar Elecs., 819 F. Supp. at 877; Resorts Int'l, 813 F.
Supp. at 290; Martin, 811 F. Supp. at 683; 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 46, § 3845.
55. See Isbrandtsen Marine Sews., 1991 WL 211293, at *2-*3 (involving
the FSIA and granting a 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer motion only after determining that the foreign state lacked immunity under the commercial activities exception and that the transferee court would, therefore, have had subject matter jurisdiction in a case originally brought before it). Cf. Tifa Ltd. v.
Republic of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.N.J. 1988) (observing that the
transferor court must also have subject matter jurisdiction to grant a transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and ordering a transfer of venue only after determining that the foreign state lacked immunity under the commercial activities exception).
56. See Totonelly v. Cardiology Assocs. of Corpus Christi, 932 F. Supp.
621, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Melvin Simon Prods.,
Inc., 774 F. Supp. 858, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), for the proposition that "[clourts
routinely transfer cases where the principal events occurred, and the principal witnesses are located in another district"); Johnston, 158 F.R.D. at 50405 (citing the location of proof, witnesses and the occurrence of operative
facts as factors supporting the transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
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5 7
nity require important contacts with the United States,
strong transfer motions tend to undermine assertions of
immunity. Thus, in the rare cases where foreign states
combine assertions of immunity with alternative requests
for transfers of venue under § 1404(a), they have claimed
that the underlying events lack significant contact with the
United States, but that any conceivable nexus would lie
within the transferee forum. 8 By asserting a general absence of contact with the United States, however, foreign
states subvert the argument that litigation in the transferee
courts would be so overwhelmingly more convenient as to
overcome the plaintiffs' choice of forum. 9 Thus, to the extent that foreign states actually request transfers under §
1404(a), they seem unlikely to prevail on the merits (unless
they are prepared to concede non-immunity).
Finally, even if foreign states could make persuasive requests for transfers of venue, § 1404(a) would not completely eliminate the booby trap. To be sure, transfers of
venue would move the litigation to more convenient locations. Following transfers under § 1404(a), however, the
transferee courts must apply the same choice-of-law rules6 '
and statutes of limitations" that the transferor courts
would have applied. This, in turn, preserves the incentive
for plaintiffs to secure tactical advantages by initiating litigation in remote state courts with favorable choice-of-law
rules and statutes of limitations.
Thus, transfers of venue under § 1404(a) hold little
promise in protecting foreign states from inconvenience,

57. See supra notes 22 and 24 and accompanying text.
58. See Alonso v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 1999 WL 244102, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1999); Ratnaswamy, 1996 WL 507267, at *12.
59. See id.
60. See Isbrandtsen Marine Servs., 1991 WL 211293, at *1-*4 (granting a
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer motion under the FSIA after determining that
most of the witnesses were located in the transferee court's jurisdiction, a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred
in the transferee forum, and the transferee court would have subject matter
jurisdiction due to the defendant's apparent lack of immunity).
61. See Moore v. Nat'1 Distillers & Chem. Corp., 143 F.R.D. 526, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964));
DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 132-33; Young, supra note 13, at 492-93.

62. See Translinear, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 538 F. Supp. 141, 143
(D.D.C. 1982) (citing Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639).
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unfavorable choice-of-law rules, and lengthy statutes of
limitations following removal of actions from remote state
courts. Because the legal requirements for transfer seem
incompatible with the assertion of immunity, foreign states
will rarely request transfers or make compelling applications for transfer. Furthermore, because successful transfers under § 1404(a) do not prevent the application of the
transferor courts' choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations, foreign states remain exposed to the sort of harassment that the FSIA seeks to avoid.
V. ELIMINATING THE BOOBY TRAP THROUGH RIGOROUS AND
ATTENTIVE CONSTRUCTION

Although one might be tempted to blame the FSIA's
drafters for creating a statutory pitfall, the booby trap actually represents an illusion perpetuated by cursory interpretations of the FSIA. Activation of the booby trap depends
on two assumptions about the powers of federal district
courts following removal from seriously inconvenient state
courts, namely that they provide the appropriate venue and
can exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign states. As
explained below, the first assumption enjoys only partial
validity and-contrary to the prevailing view of federal
courts-the second assumption may be utterly false.
For civil actions removed to federal court by a foreign
state, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) indisputably fixes federal venue
in the district and division embracing the place where such
action was pending in state court.6 Although one might assume that this provision extinguishes all objections to
venue, 6 one observer suggests that principles of derivative
jurisdiction preserve the ability of foreign states to raise objections to venue under state law even after removal.' According to traditional principles of derivative jurisdiction,
federal courts sit in a "strictly derivative posture relative
to... state court proceedings" after removal,' so that de63. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
64. See Young, supra note 13, at 492-93. See also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
65. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 132 & n.40.

66. Id. at 132.
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fendants can make any objection to subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or venue that might have been
available had the action remained in state court.6 7 Furthermore, because the FSIA's venue provisions apply only
in federal district courts, state courts would apply their own
venue rules.' Therefore, under the principles of derivative
jurisdiction, foreign states may protect themselves from
harassment by objecting to venue under state law in federal
court following removal.
Although several federal courts have permitted venue
objections on state-law grounds following removal in nonFSIA cases,69 this view has not received universal acceptance. In one recent case, a federal district court held that
the 1988 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) completely supplanted the principle of derivative jurisdiction by providing
that federal courts are "not precluded from hearing and determining any claim.., because the State court ... did not
have jurisdiction over that claim."" Therefore, the federal
court refused to consider the defendant's state-law objections to venue."' One may reject this holding as a misinterpretation of § 1441(e). Although the statute is not a model
67. See, e.g., Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 449 (1943); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Nationwide Eng'g & Control Sys., Inc. v. Thomas, 837 F.2d 345, 347-48 (8th
Cir. 1988); Garden Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 238 F.2d 651, 653 (ist Cir. 1956);
Dunn v. Cedar Rapids Eng'g Co., 152 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1945); McCurtain County Prod. Corp. v. Cowett, 482 F. Supp. 809, 813 (E.D. Okla. 1978);
In re Lummis' Estate, 118 F. Supp. 436, 440 (D.N.J. 1954); Laffoon v. J.M.
Farrin & Co., 57 F. Supp. 908, 910-11 (W.D. Mo. 1944); Harrison v. Steffen,
51 F. Supp. 225, 226 (E.D. Ky. 1943).
68. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 132. Accord Lucchino v. Foreign
Countries of Brazil, South Korea, Spain, Mexico & Argentina, 476 A.2d 1369,
1375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (applying state venue rules in a case against
foreign states).
69. See PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 72-73
(2d Cir. 1998); Lambert, 983 F.2d at 1113 n.2; Crumrine v. NEG Micon USA,
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-28 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Tanzman v. Midwest
Express Airlines, 916 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Brown v. Texarkana Nat'] Bank, 889 F. Supp. 351, 352 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (quoting Cobb v.
Nat'l Lead Co., 215 F. Supp. 48, 51 (E.D. Ark. 1963)). See also 14B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 n. 140 (3d ed.
1998) (asserting that "Ithe derivative-jurisdiction concept still applies to
venue").
70. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Id.
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of clarity," its sole purpose and effect is to eliminate the derivative73 character of subject matter jurisdiction in removed

cases.
Other federal courts and observers have rejected postremoval, state-law objections to venue because: the principle of derivative jurisdiction does not apply to nonjurisdictional concepts like venue; 7' removal constitutes a
general waiver of objections to venue; 75 and federal law governs procedural issues (such as venue) following removal. 6
This diversity of precedent renders the ability to raise postremoval, state-law objections to venue so unclear that a
major treatise seems to take conflicting positions.
Under
the circumstances, one cannot conclude that post-removal,

72. See Oakley, supra note 13, at 983 (acknowledging that 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (e) "may not be ideally drafted").
73. See id. (observing that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) permits federal courts to
exercise removal jurisdiction over actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts that were mistakenly filed in state court). See also 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1075
n.58 (2d ed. 1987) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) "deals only with subject matter jurisdiction").
74. See Buffington v. Vulcan Mfg. Corp., 94 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (W.D. Ark.
1950).
75. See Boyce v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 1993 WL 175371, *4
(E.D. Pa. May 25, 1993): 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 69, §
3726. While not specifically mentioning state law, a number of courts have
treated removal as a waiver of objections to venue. See, e.g., Willowbrook
Found., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 629, 635 (N.D. Miss.
2000); Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 71 F. Supp. 2d 769, 779 (N.D. Ohio 1999);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Herzog Servs., Inc, 990 F. Supp. 503, 504
(N.D. Tex. 1998); Jeffrey Mining Prods. v. Left Fork Mining Co., 992 F. Supp.
937, 939 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
76. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 321-22
(D. Minn. 1980) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 governs the venue of removed
actions, thus rendering "irrelevant" any original impropriety of venue in the
state court). See also Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d
542, 547-48 (D.N.J. 2000) ("Once a case has been removed to federal court,
federal rather than state law governs the future course of proceedings ....
Therefore, federal procedure, rather than state procedure governs [the action
following removal]").
77. Compare 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 69, § 3722
n. 140 (asserting that "[tihe derivative-jurisdiction concept still applies to
venue"), with 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 69, § 3726 (stating that "venue may be proper in the federal court even if it was not proper in
the state court in which the action originally was brought, since the defendant effectively waives any objection to the state court's venue by seeking removal").
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state-law objections to venue can eliminate the booby trap,
at least in all jurisdictions.
Even if federal courts were prepared to receive postremoval, state-law objections to venue, one struggles to
identify the appropriate remedy. Although dismissal for
improper venue remains a possibility,"8 few courts would
have enthusiasm for that result in the absence of a jurisdictional defect.' While federal courts might readily agree to
transfer such cases,' the proper mechanism remains unclear. After sustaining a post-removal, state-law objection
to venue, one federal court recently transferred the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).8' Because that statute
governs the transfer of improperly venued actions and requires transferee courts to apply their own choice-of-law
rules and statutes of limitations, its application eliminates
the opportunity for forum-shopping and, with it, the booby
82
trap.
Other federal courts have indicated that post-removal
transfers must occur under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because
federal venue remains proper in the transferor court.' This
78. See Brown v. Texarkana Nat'l Bank, 889 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark.
1995).
79. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 127 (implying that successful venue
challenges do not often result in outright dismissal). See also 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, supra note 72, § 1075 n.58 (indicating
that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) reflects congressional disapproval of dismissals of
removed actions over which federal courts have jurisdiction).
80. See DELLAPENNA, supranote 6, at 127 (observing that successful venue
challenges usually result in transfers to appropriate fora).
81. See Crumrine v. NEG Micon USA, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-30
(N.D. Iowa 2000).
82. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
83. See Jeffrey Mining Prods. v. Left Fork Mining Co., 992 F. Supp. 937,
938 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("A defendant who removes an action from state court
cannot then turn around and request a venue transfer pursuant to §
1406(a)... because that party implicitly sanctioned venue in the federal district where he sought to move the state lawsuit."). A major treatise advocates
the same principle:
If a district court is the appropriate forum for venue purposes under Section 1441, then a subsequent transfer to another federal
district court must be based on Section 1404(a), rather than on
Section 1406(a) of the Judicial Code. The latter section is applicable only in actions in which there is improper venue in the
transferor court, which would not be the case since venue would
be proper under Section 1441 ....

14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 69, § 3726. This also seems
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view seems consistent with the reasoning of the only FSIA
In that case, the U.S. plaintiff
case remotely on point.'
sued a foreign state in a state court sitting in Harris
County, Texas (near Houston and within the Southern District of Texas), which presumably would have been an improper venue because the relevant contacts and events occurred in Dallas, Texas (in Dallas County, about 250 miles
from Houston and within the Northern District of Texas).
After removal from state court to the Southern District of
Texas, the foreign state moved to dismiss for improper
venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the
District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).85 Although
the Southern District of Texas granted the latter request,
the District of Columbia District Court held that the Texas
court had applied the wrong transfer statute.86 Since federal venue was proper in the Texas court, 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) provided the only authority to transfer venue. 7 Because that statute requires application of the transferor
court's choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations," its
application preserves opportunities for forum-shopping
and, thus, fails to eliminate the booby trap."8
To recapitulate, some jurisdictions would eliminate the
booby trap by allowing foreign states to raise venue objections under state law after removal. By contrast, several
other jurisdictions either do not recognize the propriety of
such objections or seem to identify 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as
the sole authority for post-removal transfers. Under these
circumstances, it becomes difficult to treat post-removal,
consistent with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which only provides a remedy
for defects in federal venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ("The district court of a
district in which is fied a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought.") (emphasis added).
84. See generally Translinear, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 538 F. Supp. 141
(D.D.C. 1982).
85. See id. at 143.
86. See id. at 143-44.
87. See id. at 144. See also Young, supra note 13, at 491 n.146 (discussing the FSIA's removal provision and concluding that "[i]f an action is removed pursuant to § 1441(d), any subsequent transfer must be pursuant to §
1404(a)") (emphasis added).
88. See Translinear, 538 F. Supp. at 143-44; Young, supra note 13, at
492-93.
89. See supranotes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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state-law venue objections as a reliable tool for avoiding the
booby trap.
Objections to personal jurisdiction based on state longarm statutes and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provide a stronger
conceptual basis for eliminating the booby trap. Despite
some initial confusion,9° most authorities now recognize
that the FSIA's provisions on subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction do not apply to state-court litigation. ", This, in turn, prevents the tests for jurisdiction and
immunity from melding in state court. To obtain personal
jurisdiction over non-immune foreign states in state courts,
plaintiffs must satisfy the applicable state long-arm statutes, as limited by the Fourteenth Amendment." At the
90. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 106 (noting a failure of courts and
writers to recognize that the FSIA does not alter ordinary rules of state judicial jurisdiction).
91. See Interlotto, Inc. v. Nat'l Lottery Admin., 689 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J.
App. Div. 1997); Martinelli v. Djakarta Lloyd P.N., 431 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749
(N.Y. City Ct. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 458; DELLAPENNA,
supra note 6, at 106-07. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at
12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611 (explaining that "section 1330...
provides for subject matter and personal jurisdiction of U.S. district courts
over foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities") (emphasis added); Sablic v. Croatia Line, 719 A.2d 172, 173 (N.J.
App. Div. 1998) (using contacts with the forum state to assess the foreign
state's amenability to personal jurisdiction); Lucchino v. Foreign Countries of
Brazil, South Korea, Spain, Mexico & Argentina, 476 A.2d 1369, 1376 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984) (citing a state statute as the source of authority for exercising personal jurisdiction over the foreign-state defendants).
Although the House Report suggests that the FSIA's jurisdictional
structure would apply in state courts, this probably represents an incorrect
paraphrasing of the section-by-section analysis jointly submitted by the Departments of State and Justice. CornpareH.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note
2, at 27, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6626 ("Claimants will clearly benefit from ... the certainty that section 1330(b) of the bill confers personal jurisdiction over a foreign state in Federaland State courts as to every claim for
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.") (emphasis added), with
Section-by-Section Analysis accompanying Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll,
Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Deputy Attorney General, to
Hon. Nelson D. Rockefeller, President of the Senate (Oct. 31, 1975), supra
note 2, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. at 113 ("Claimants will clearly benefit from...
the certainty that ...
service [of process] will, under Section 1330(b) of the
bill, confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court as to
every claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.") (emphasis added).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 458; Interlotto, 689 A.2d at
151; DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 106-07. Accord Sablic, 719 A.2d at 173;
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very least, this requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
defendants have established minimum contacts with the forum state (as opposed to the entire United States), and that
the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.93 The need to
demonstrate the existence of minimum contacts with a particular state makes it incrementally more difficult to establish personal jurisdiction over non-immune foreign states.9
Returning to the previous example and the discussion
of derivative jurisdiction," if (a) a plaintiff sued the foreign
state in an Alaska, Hawaii, or Minnesota state court, and
(b) the foreign state removed the action to federal court,
then (c) the foreign state should be able to request dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under the state longarm statute, as limited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
argument for applying the principle of derivative jurisdiction seems compelling because Congress explicitly did not
intend 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) to cure defects in territorial jurisdiction. 6 Furthermore, it seems well established that
9 7
removal does not waive objections to personal jurisdiction.
Lucchino, 476 A.2d at 1376.
93. See Interlotto, 689 A.2d at 151.
94. See Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co. v. Viskoza-Loznica, 33 F. Supp.
644, 650 & n.2 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (indicating that the requirements for personal jurisdiction are "somewhat more stringent" under state long-arm statutes than they are under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b)). Congress evidently thought
that this would provide further encouragement for plaintiffs to bring claims
against foreign states in federal court. Cf.H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supranote
2,at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611 (suggesting that "broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be conducive to uniformity in decision").
95. See supra notes 31-32 and 66-67.
96. The House Report states that "[olne commentator on the bill... suggested statutory clarification on the question of the impact of the bill on territorial jurisdiction. Federal courts are often confined to the long-farm] authority of the states in which they sit. The Committee does not intend to cure any
defect in territorial jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 99-423, at 14, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1545, 1554. See also Eccles v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp.,
10 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 n.4 (D. Md. 1998) (holding that "§ 1441(e) does not
prevent [a defendant] from raising the state court's lack of personal jurisdiction after removal"); DELLAPENNA, supra note 6, at 108 (suggesting that 28
U.S.C. § 1441(e) does not eliminate the principle of derivative jurisdiction
with respect to personal jurisdiction).
97. See, e.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 306, 314
(1929); Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir.
1996); Silva v. City of Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Thus, objections to personal jurisdiction based on state
long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment provide
a more logical basis for eliminating the booby trap from the
FSIA's removal provisions.
Diligent research, however, reveals that federal courts
almost invariably cite 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) as the source of
authority for exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign
states after removal to federal court.98 In one removed action, a federal district court specifically rejected as "irrelevant" the parties' arguments regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction under state law.' In another removed action, the federal district court held that the state long-arm
statute and the Fourteenth Amendment required dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 °° On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not
question the propriety of dismissal under state law and the
Fourteenth Amendment, ° ' but simply identified § 1330(b)
98. See, e.g., Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 845
(5th Cir. 2000); Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174
F.3d 969, 973-74 (9th Cir. 1999); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., 985 F.2d
1534, 1552-53 (1 lth Cir. 1993); Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404,
1411 (9th Cir. 1990); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281,
283-84 (9th Cir. 1989); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 n.5
(5th Cir. 1985); Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 395 (2d Cir. 1985); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1983); Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 35 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd,
216 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, 1996 WL 507267,
at *10-*11 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996); Berdakin v. Consulado de la Republica de El Salvador, 912 F. Supp 458, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Coleman v. Alcolac, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1388, 1400-01 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Talbot v. Saipem
A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Zernicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), 614 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
The author found one exception to this general trend. See Kern v.
Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 533-34 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (using
contacts with the State of Texas to assess the amenability of foreign sovereign
defendants to personal jurisdiction in a removed action). Because the court
did not explain its selection of state contacts, as opposed to national contacts, one cannot be certain that the court attributed any significance to the
fact that the case fell within its removal jurisdiction. In any event, the Fifth
Circuit's contrary analysis in Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. diminishes the precedential importance that Kern might otherwise possess.
99. Ratnaswamy, 1996 WL 507267, at * 11 n.4
100. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1541-42, 1552.
101. The plaintiff purchased a 1982-model French automobile from her
brother in North Carolina in 1988, when both the plaintiff and her brother
resided in that state. See id. at 1537. Later, the plaintiff moved to Georgia,
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and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as providing the applicable standards for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.'0 2 This allowed the Eleventh Circuit to meld
the questions of immunity and jurisdiction into a single test
based on national contacts. Concluding that the foreign
state had sufficient contacts with the United States as a
whole, the Eleventh Circuit held that the federal district
court had personal jurisdiction over the foreign state. 0 3
Although the foregoing precedent bodes ill for postremoval motions to dismiss based on state long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, one should recognize
that the holdings rest on a cursory and obviously flawed interpretation of the FSIA. The assertion that § 1330(b) governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign states
in removed cases does not withstand critical analysis. Section 1330(b) only applies to "claims in which the district
courts have [subject matter] jurisdiction under subsection
(a) of J§ 1330]. '""c Section 1330(a), in turn, only defines the
"original jurisdiction" of federal district courts, meaning
their subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions originally
brought against foreign states in federal courts. By contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) defines the removal jurisdiction of
federal district courts, meaning their subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions removed from state court to federal
court. Following removal, federal district courts cannot
possibly "have [original subject matter] jurisdiction under
subsection (a) [of § 1330]."1' Therefore, § 1330(b) cannot
where she was involved in an automobile accident and where she sued the
French manufacturer for negligent design and manufacture of the automobile's passenger restraint system. See id. at 1537, 1541. Although the
French manufacturer had established a marketing subsidiary to sell automobiles in the United States, see id., one struggles to identify any facts demonstrating that it purposefully established minimum contacts with the State of
Georgia. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 29596 (1980) (holding that a court in Oklahoma could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York automobile dealership based on the plaintiffs unilateral decision to move from New York to Arizona via Oklahoma).
102. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1553.
103. See id. at 1545-53.
104. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6612 ("For personal jurisdiction to exist under section
1330(b), the claim must first of all be one over which the district courts have
(emphasis added).
originaljurisdictionunder section 1330(a) ..
105. 28 U.S.C. §1330(b).
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govern the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign
states in cases removed to federal court.
Lacking any other statutory authorization for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign states following
removal, federal courts must turn to state long-arm statutes (as limited by the Fourteenth Amendment and imported via the principle of derivative jurisdiction). Restored
to their proper role in removed actions, state long-arm statutes will protect foreign states against litigation in seriously
inconvenient fora and from other forms of harassment.
Thus, careful and attentive application of the FSIA by federal courts can eliminate a potential booby trap from the
escape hatch that Congress made available to foreign
states.
VI. CONCLUSION

The FSIA's removal provisions aim to give foreign states
free access to the perceived high intellectual quality of federal courts, as well as protection from harassment and
some irritating features of U.S. litigation. In an ironic twist
of fate, state courts have perceived important limitations in
the FSIA's jurisdictional structure, whereas cursory analyses by federal courts have prevented full appreciation of
those limitations in removed actions. The resulting gap in
understanding undermines the FSIA's broad objectives by
exposing foreign states to harassment and forum-shopping.
The FSIA's silver anniversary provides the occasion not
only to critique the statute, but also those who have applied
it. As suggested by the foregoing discussion, one might
fairly conclude that we have placed undue emphasis on the
goal of facilitating litigation against foreign states and have
neglected the goal of minimizing the irritations of such litigation. Too frequently, we fail to perform the careful and
attentive analyses that provide the first line of defense
against interpretive problems. The statute may require improvement, but so do we.

